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revised.ABSTRACT
This paper reviews hypotheses about the impacts of rural population growth on
agriculture and natural resource management in developing countries and the implications
for productivity, poverty, and natural resource conditions.  Impacts on household and
collective decisions are considered, and it is argued that population growth is more likely
to have negative impacts when there is no collective responses than when population
growth induces infrastructure development, collective action, institutional or
organizational development.  The impacts of population pressure, particularly on natural
resource conditions, may be very different in different contexts, depending on the nature
of local markets, institutions, and other factors.  Thus careful and comparative empirical
work is needed in different contexts before general conclusions can be drawn.  There is
still a lack of such empirical evidence.
The results of one study in central Honduras are used to examine some of the
hypotheses presented.  The results support neo-Malthusian concerns about the effects of
population growth on land degradation, but also provide some support to Boserupian
predictions that population pressure will induce adoption of labor-intensive land
improvements, collective action to manage natural resources, and organizational
development.  In general, however, the impacts of population pressure were found to be
relatively small and other factors, including infrastructure development and technical
assistance programs, had stronger impacts on agricultural change and natural resource
management.  Although induced innovation theory argues that population pressure may
induce such policy responses, we found that these interventions were more likely in less-
densely populated communities.  This emphasizes that such “induced” policy responses
to population pressure do not happen automatically.i
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The impacts of population growth on agriculture and natural resource
management have been debated at least since the time of Malthus.  Although the dismal
predictions of Malthus regarding the inability of agricultural production to keep pace with
population growth have not come to pass in the industrialized nations, agricultural
production per capita has fallen and poverty has increased in many developing countries
in recent decades (especially in Africa).  In addition, there are serious and growing
concerns about the impacts of rapid population growth on natural resources, including
forests, land, water, biodiversity, and other resources (World Commission on
Environment and Development, 1987; Ehrlich and Ehrlich 1990).
In contrast to the dire predictions of the neo-Malthusian perspective, a more
optimistic perspective has arisen in recent decades as well, following from the work of
Ester Boserup and others Boserup (1965, 1981), Ruthenberg (1980) and others have
emphasized the responses of households, communities and societies to pressures induced
by population growth, including reduction in fallow periods, intensified use of labor and2
capital per unit of land, development and adoption of labor-intensive technologies, and
institutional changes (such as development of more specific and individual property rights
and development of markets).   It is generally accepted that such responses, to the extent
that they occur, should increase agricultural production per unit of land, though their
impacts on labor productivity, output per capita and poverty have been debated (e.g.,
Robinson and Schutjer, 1984; Salehi-Isfahani, 1988; Krautkraemer, 1994).  The impacts
on natural resources are also debated (Blaikie and Brookfield, 1987; Lele and Stone,
1989; Panayotou, 1994).
The evidence on these issues is mixed.  For example, an often cited study of the
Machakos district in Kenya found that between the 1930’s and the 1990’s, per capita
income had increased, erosion was much better controlled, and trees were more prevalent
in the landscape, despite a five-fold increase in population (Tiffen, Mortimore and
Gichuki, 1994), supporting the Boserup perspective.  Numerous other studies have also
found positive associations between population growth, agricultural intensification and
investments in land improvement and resource conservation (see Templeton and Scherr,
1997, and the references cited therein).  However, many studies have also found
population growth to be associated with various aspects of resource degradation,
including deforestation, overgrazing, soil erosion, soil nutrient depletion, and other
problems (see studies cited by Templeton and Scherr; Panayotou, 1994; Kates and
Haarmann, 1992).
Part of the difficulty in reaching definitive conclusions about the relationship
between population growth and natural resource conditions is due to the fact that there are3
many complex and interdependent ways in which population growth may affect
agricultural and natural resource management decisions by households, communities and
societies.  Population growth may affect natural resource management by affecting
household decisions about land use, labor or capital intensity, product choice, technology
adoption, off-farm employment, migration, or fertility (Bilsborrow and Carr, 1998;
Panayotou, 1994; Boserup, 1965).  It may affect natural resource management by
affecting community and societal decisions relating to collective management of common
property resources (Baland and Platteau 1996); development or adaptation of technology
(Boserup 1965; Hayami and Ruttan 1985); investments in infrastructure (Ibid.);
development of property rights, land tenure relations, markets or other institutions (Ibid.;
North, 1990; Scherr and Hazell, 1994); or development of organizations (Pender and
Scherr, 1999).   
By affecting poverty, distribution of wealth, or other outcomes, population growth
may also cause changes in resource management through feedback effects from these
outcomes. For example, poverty may increase resource degradation by causing people to
have a short time horizon in their decisions (Pender 1996; Holden, Shiferaw and Wik
1998), or may promote labor-intensive investments in resource conservation by farmers
who have few alternative investment opportunities or low opportunity cost of family
labor (Pender and Kerr, 1998). 
Adding to the complexity of the issue is the fact that the impacts of population
growth likely depend on many site-specific conditioning factors, such as agricultural
potential, fragility of the resource base, market integration, initial population density,4
local human and social capital endowments, and other factors (Pender, Place and Ehui,
1999; Pender, Scherr, and Duron, 1999; Lopez, 1998; Tiffen, et al. 1994; Panayotou,
1994).  Moreover, resource degradation or improvement is a multi-dimensional and site-
specific concept; improvements in one type of resource or in resources in one location
may be associated with degradation of other resources or resources in another location. 
For example, intensification of crop production may reduce pressure on forests but
increase problems of soil erosion and nutrient depletion; enclosures of common grazing
areas may lead to regeneration in enclosed areas but more rapid degradation of other
grazing areas.
The purpose of this chapter is to sort through these complexities by reviewing key
hypotheses about the impacts of rural population growth on agriculture, natural resource
management, and related impacts on poverty in developing countries.  I will consider
factors conditioning the hypotheses, different aspects of resource management, and some
of the evidence available with respect to these hypotheses.  The emphasis of this paper is
on the impacts of rural population growth.  I do not consider in detail the broader set of
linkages resulting from urban population growth, industrial development and the
feedback effects on the agricultural and rural sectors.  I have not conducted an exhaustive
literature review of the evidence, but rely on some of the excellent literature reviews that
have recently been completed (e.g., Templeton and Scherr, 1997; Panayotou, 1994).   I
then present results of recent field research conducted by the International Food Policy
Research Institute on some of these issues in central Honduras, which represents a case of
relatively low population density but rapid population growth.5
2.  HOUSEHOLD RESPONSES TO RURAL POPULATION GROWTH
I will proceed by considering possible responses to rural population growth,
beginning with those that involve the least departure from the ways of doing things in the
past (e.g., extensification of agriculture using the same methods), and considering later
those that involve more investment, collective action and/or reorganization of social
relations (e.g., changes in institutions such as property rights).  A general hypothesis
consistent with the evolutionary perspective of Boserup is that the responses requiring
greater investment and accommodation are likely to come later, though this may not
always hold if the pressures for change are very rapid or sudden, or if certain favorable
factors exist (e.g., the opening up of a road may create a sudden increase in demand for
private land titles, and this may be fulfilled if a land titling program happens to be already
in place).  
I consider responses mainly at the household and local community level.  This is
not to assert that responses occur only at these levels.  Responses of course occur at the
individual level, and household production decisions may not be adequately reflected by a
unitary household model (Udry, 1996). Important responses are also made above the
community level; e.g., by policy makers.  I abstract from those complications to keep the
task manageable, though this is not to argue that these other levels are unimportant. 
For each type of response, I propose hypotheses about the factors favoring or
inhibiting it, and the expected impacts of the response on indicators of agricultural
productivity (including land productivity and labor productivity), human welfare (income6
and welfare per capita and distribution of welfare), and natural resource conditions
(including impacts on forests, soil erosion, soil fertility, water availability and quality). 
Many other indicators of natural resource conditions (such as biodiversity) or human
welfare (such as per capita food consumption) could also be suggested; I do not consider
them for reasons of space and the possibility that the impacts on these may be largely
reflected in the indicators mentioned.  For example, the qualitative direction of impacts
on biodiversity may be very similar to the impacts on forests. 
The general types of household level responses to rural population growth include
extensification of agricultural production using traditional methods, intensification of
labor per unit of land using traditional methods (i.e., shortening fallow cycles), adoption
of more labor-intensive methods of production (e.g., hand hoeing and weeding, mulching,
composting), labor-intensive investments in land (e.g., soil and water conservation
structures), adoption of capital intensive methods (e.g., use of draft animals, equipment,
purchased agricultural inputs), knowledge intensive responses (e.g., development or
adaptation of new techniques, such as biological conservation measures, integrated pest
management, or integrated soil nutrient management), changes in product mix (e.g.,
adoption of more labor-intensive crops, integration of crops with livestock products,
adoption of higher value products), changes in occupation (e.g., development of off-farm
income), migration, and reduction in fertility.  The hypotheses about these responses are
summarized in Table 1.7
Table 1  Hypotheses about household responses to rural population growth
Response Conditioning Factors
Productivity Human Welfare Natural Resource Conditions
Land Labor Income Welfare/ Dist. of Forest Soil Soil Water
/Capita Capita Welfare Erosion Fertility
Extensification - Low population density
- Open access land available and accessible 0 0 0 0 0 - - 0/- -
- Land relatively homogeneous in quality
Shorter fallow - Rising population density
- Open access land becoming unavailable - - - -
- Emphasis first on better quality land
- Alternative opportunities for labor limited
0/- - 0/- - -
Labor-intensive - Rising population density
practices  - Open access land becoming unavailable 0 -
- Emphasis first on better quality land
- Alternative opportunities for labor limited
0/- - 0/- 0 0 0/+ +/-
Labor-intensive land - High population density
investments - near term - Land tenure security 0/- - 0/- - +/- 0 0/+ 0/+ +/-
- Agroecological suitability
- Commercialization (+/-)
- Off-farm opportunities (+/-)
- Land market development





0 0 0 0 +/- 0 0 0 +/-8
Table 1  Hypotheses about household responses to rural population growth (continued)
Response Conditioning Factors
Productivity Human Welfare Natural Resource Conditions
Land Labor Income Welfare/ Dist. of Forest Soil Soil Water
/Capita Welfare Erosion Fertility Capita
Capital intensification - Medium population density 0/+ 0 0 0 0/- - - +/0 -
– draft animals/plow - Elimination of woody fallows, increased
demand for bottomland with heavy soils
- Climate and disease (humid tropics limit
adoption)
- Longer growing season or irrigation 
- Market access
-Access to credit
Capital intensification - Complementarity to labor 0/+ 0/+ 0 0 0/- +/- +/- +/- -
– purchased inputs - Climate risks, irrigation 
- Access to roads, markets
- Commercialization, production of high value
crops
- Access to credit
-Government trade, exchange rate, marketing
policies (+/-)
Knowledge - Changing factor scarcities (induced 0/+ 0/+ 0 0 0/- +/- 0 0 0/+
intensification innovation hypothesis)
- Growing population (reduces per capita costs
of innovation)
- Mechanisms to share costs of innovation or
reward innovators for external benefits 
Change in product - Similar to factors affecting labor 0 - 0/- - 0/- 0/+ +/- +/- +/-
mix- adoption of labor- intensification
intensive products
Change in product - Higher population density
mix- increased 0 0/+ +/-
specialization
- Development of infrastructure and markets 0 0 0/- +/- +/- +/-9
Table 1  Hypotheses about household responses to rural population growth (continued)
Response Conditioning Factors
Productivity Human Welfare Natural Resource Conditions
Land Labor Income Welfare/ Dist. of Forest Soil Soil Water
/Capita Welfare Erosion Fertility Capita
Changes in occupation/ - Education and training - 0 0/+ 0 0/+ 0/+ +/- +/- +/-
Migration - Opportunities for labor in other occupations
- Infrastructure development
- Labor mobility
- Land tenure security
- Land and housing market development
- Availability of social services in urban areas
Reduction in fertility- - Costs and availability of education, food, - 0 0/+ 0 +/- 0/+ +/- +/- 0/+
effects on age structure health care
- Expected wage levels 
- Availability of open access resources
- Property rights/land tenure arrangements
- Means to assure security in old age
- Education and status of women; family
planning10
EXTENSIFICATION
Extensification of agricultural production using traditional methods of shifting
cultivation is the first response one would expect to population growth in situations of
low population density with large amounts of open access land available, of relatively
good quality for agricultural production, and relatively accessible (Boserup, 1965;
Binswanger and McIntire 1987).  All of the conditioning factors are important.  There are
many situations (most common in Latin America) of low population density where
agricultural expansion by smallholders is not possible because most suitable and
accessible land is owned and protected by large farmers or ranchers.  There are also many
places where open access land exists, but agricultural expansion is limited because they
are not well suited to agriculture (e.g., much of the humid tropics of Africa, where
problems of pests and disease inhibit agricultural expansion) and/or remote (e.g., much of
the Amazon region).  In most areas of high population density, little open access land
usually remains.  An exception is where state or community ownership of land prevails
but is not well enforced, leading to a situation of de facto open access.  This situation is
common in many state forests in developing countries (Otsuka, 1998).  Not surprisingly,
such forests are rapidly disappearing.
Where extensification is possible and the available land is relatively suitable for
agricultural production, extensification is expected to have little impact on agricultural
productivity per unit of land used or per unit of labor.  In this situation, there will also be
little impact on income per capita (including the value of subsistence production) or the
distribution of income, since land of suitable quality is available to all.  The main impacts11
of this response will be on resource conditions, and these will mainly be negative.  Forest
resources will be depleted as agriculture expands.  In hilly terrain, this will likely lead to
increased soil erosion as land cover is reduced through slash and burn.  The reduction in
forest cover and increase in soil erosion can lead to reduced availability of water in the
local ecosystem by increasing runoff, and reducing the capacity of the ecosystem to store
and recycle water through uptake by plants and evapotranspiration.   Erosion and runoff
can reduce the quality of water downstream and cause increased problems of flooding and
sedimentation of rivers and reservoirs.  Soil fertility will decline as a result of erosion,
leaching and crop production without full recycling of the nutrients.  However, fertility
can again recover provided that the cropping cycle is short enough and the fallow cycle
long enough to allow woody fallow to return (Vasey, 1979).  
Once extensification has proceeded to where the land available is less suitable for
agricultural production, further extensification may be slowed and farmers may have
incentive to intensify production on the better quality lands instead.  To the extent
extensification continues to be pursued, it is likely where it is a lower cost option to
intensification, though production costs likely will be higher than where land is of better
quality.  This is because farmers may have to work harder to clear the land, clear more
land to achieve the same production, or plant crops for a shorter period due to more
rapidly declining fertility.   Production per unit of land cropped is likely to fall (especially
in the second case), as is production per unit of labor (in all cases).  Although
productivity is likely to fall, production per capita may not, since farmers may work
harder to maintain subsistence consumption.  As long as this response is possible and12
continues, there will be little impact on income per capita or its distribution, although
household welfare will decline as a result of lower labor productivity and increased labor
input.  The qualitative effects on resources will be similar to the effects discussed above
for the case of uniform land quality, except that the magnitude of effects are likely to
become greater as extensification proceeds into lands that are more susceptible to
degradation, such as steeply sloping lands, or lands where soil fertility is low or apt to
decline rapidly.  
In summary, extensification likely represents the least cost response to population
pressure from the farmers’ perspective, where open access land of suitable quality is
available and accessible.  The costs in terms of depletion of unpriced resources may be
very large, however.  These costs, as well as the costs to the farmer, are expected to rise
as such land begins to be used up, and lower quality or more remote land must be used. 
As population continues to increase, the costs of continuing expansion eventually become
greater than the costs of more intensive production on better quality or more accessible
land, and intensification eventually begins to occur.  Of course, there may still be land
available for extensification (though at higher cost), and as intensification proceeds and as
the costs of this strategy rises, some extensification may continue to occur.  Thus,
intensification and extensification may occur simultaneously for some time, as long as
some open access land is still available.13
 This, of course, applies only to areas where the original climax vegetation is
1
forest.  Where the original vegetation is bush or grassland, declining fallow periods would
still be expected to alter the original vegetative composition and to lead to declining soil
fertility.
SHORTENING THE FALLOW CYCLE
When intensification first begins, farmers are likely to simply shorten the fallow
cycle on better quality (or less remote) lands, returning to them sooner rather than
expanding to lower quality lands (Boserup, 1965).  As fallow periods shorten, forest
fallow is eventually replaced by bush and then grass fallow, since the forest is not given
time to regenerate.   Soil fertility is given less chance to recover, and the length of the
1
cropping period must also be reduced.  
The factors favoring this change are mainly the rising population density and
declining availability of good quality land where extensification can occur.  Insecurity of
future access to better quality lands may accelerate the process, since land left fallow may
be claimed by other users  (Otsuka 1998).  A factor that may inhibit this change (or any of
the other aspects of labor intensification discussed below) is the availability of more
remunerative opportunities for labor elsewhere.  If there are opportunities to migrate to
take advantage of available land elsewhere (extensification) or off-farm employment
opportunities (locally or through migration), the process of intensification may proceed
slowly or be halted by the flow of labor out of agriculture.  We have examined the
implications of the extensification strategy above, and will consider the off-farm
employment and migration strategies later.14
This strategy will lead to declining land productivity, due to declining soil fertility. 
There may be offsetting impacts on labor productivity, since declining productivity due to
declining soil fertility may be offset to some extent by the reduced labor requirement to
clear fallow fields, which will have less vegetation to clear (Vasey).  However, one would
expect farmers to have voluntarily reduced fallow periods earlier, if doing so increased
labor productivity (since labor is likely the constraining factor in an extensive fallow
system).  Thus, our expectation is that if population pressure forces farmers to reduce
fallow periods, the declining productivity effect outweighs the labor saving effect, and
labor productivity will begin to decline.  As long as there is still sufficient land available,
however, production per capita can still be maintained if each farmer cultivates more
land, and thus there may not be distributional effects on production and income per
capita.  Since cultivating more land with lower labor productivity requires more effort,
farmer welfare decreases however.
Many of the expected impacts of shorter fallow cycles on resource conditions are
similar to the impacts of extensification.  To the extent that forest fallow existed prior to
shortening the fallow cycle, this shortening will lead to less forest fallow land, which is
likely to have similar impacts to a reduction in primary forest.  Forest fallow can serve
many of the same environmental functions as primary forests, including preventing soil
erosion, recycling water and nutrients, and preserving biodiversity.  The expansion of
crop land relative to fallow of any kind increases the rate of soil nutrient depletion and
possibly of soil erosion, since most types of fallow likely provide better vegetative cover15
of the soil than most crops (possibly excluding some perennial crops) during periods of
erosive rainfall.
  
ADOPTION OF MORE LABOR-INTENSIVE METHODS
At higher levels of population density, and low levels of wages and off-farm
opportunities, adoption of more labor-intensive methods of agricultural production begin
to become economical.  Use of hoeing and hand weeding can replace burning to clear
crop fields, both because vegetation is reduced by declining fallow periods, and because
the amount of labor available per unit of land is rising.  Planting density may increase, as
may the care given to planted crops through various labor-intensive methods to improve
soil fertility, such as application of compost or mulch.
Greater labor intensity likely increases productivity per unit of land, but reduces
labor productivity as a result of diminishing returns to labor (unless complemented by
increased capital intensity or technical change, as discussed below).  As with shortening
fallow periods, farmers may compensate for reduced labor productivity by working
harder, so that production and income per capita do not decline.  Again, however, welfare
does decline as a result of declining labor productivity.  As land becomes increasingly
scarce, the distributional impacts of access to better quality land increase, with greater
welfare achieved by occupants of the better quality land, as predicted by the Ricardian
theory of rent.16
The impacts of increased labor intensity on resource conditions may be mixed,
though generally positive.  More intensive practices and reduced use of burning will
reduce the rate of deforestation and the problems associated with it.  These also may
result in greater vegetative cover being kept on the land (relative to the impacts of
burning), reducing problems of erosion.  Adoption of labor-intensive soil fertility
management practices may improve soil fertility, though these may be insufficient to
offset the increased outflow of soil nutrients resulting from increased amounts harvested
per unit of land (Smaling, 1998; Buresh, Sanchez and Calhoun 1997).
LABOR-INTENSIVE INVESTMENT IN LAND
Rising population density and declining value of labor relative to land also may
lead to labor-intensive investments in land improvement, such as construction of terraces,
bunds, check dams, live barriers, or other structures to conserve soil and water. Land
tenure security is likely a critical conditioning factor for such investments.  Without
secure tenure, farmers risk losing the benefits of such investments and thus may not make
them even if the potential benefits are high (Feder, et al. 1988).  The impact of tenure
insecurity may be reversed, however, if the act of making such investments actually
increases tenure security (Otsuka, 1998; Besley, 1995).  
Other factors conditioning such an investment response include agroecological
conditions, the extent of commercialization, the extent of off-farm opportunities, the
nature of local factor markets (especially for land, labor and credit), and poverty. 17
Agroecological conditions may have more effect on the types of investments that become
economical than on whether land improvements eventually occur as population pressure
increases.  For example, in drier environments, live barriers may have difficulties in
becoming established or may compete with crops for water, whereas physical structures
such as stone or soil bunds may yield high benefits (Herweg 1993).  In more humid
environments, by contrast, such physical structures may be less effective than biological
approaches.
Commercialization may have mixed effects on land improvements.  On one hand, it
increases the value of land, but on the other it may also increase the value of labor.  The
net effect on the relative value of land to labor will determine whether commercialization
promotes or inhibits labor-intensive land improvements.  Similarly, commodity prices
have ambiguous effects on land improvements and land degradation (LaFrance, 1992;
Pagiola, 1996).
Off-farm opportunities likely increase the value of labor and thus tend to inhibit
labor-intensive investments (Pender and Kerr, 1998; Clay, Reardon and Kangasniemi,
1998). On the other hand, off-farm income tends to increase farmers’ liquidity and reduce
their discount rates thus tending to promote investments, particularly where there is a
functioning labor market (Ibid.).
The existence of a land market may promote land improvements by reducing the
irreversibility associated with such investments (since farmers would have the option to
recoup some or all of the value of their investment by selling or leasing the land) (Pender18
and Kerr, 1999).  A land market and the ability to mortgage land may also promote
investment by increasing farmers’ access to credit (Feder, et al., 1988; Pender and Kerr,
1999).  Credit constraints may cause farmers to have high discount rates, thus reducing
incentives to invest in land improvements with high initial costs and limited near term
benefit (Pender, 1996; Holden, et al. 1998).  
Poverty may have the same effect of shortening farmers’ time horizons (Ibid.).  On
the other hand, poorer farmers may be more likely to invest in labor-intensive land
improvement because the opportunity cost of their time is lower (Pender and Kerr 1998)
or because they have fewer profitable alternative investment alternatives.
Such land improvements can be expected to eventually increase land and labor
productivity (else they would not be voluntarily adopted by farmers).  However, they may
reduce production in the near term by displacing land that otherwise would have been
used in production.  Thus they may lead to reduced production per capita in the near term
but higher production per capita in the longer term.  They may also reduce farmers’
ability to take advantage of off-farm employment opportunities, because of the labor
required to construct and maintain them, thus reducing off-farm income.  The
distributional impacts of such investments depend mainly on who is able to benefit from
them, as determined by the conditioning factors noted above.  If poverty and credit
constraints are major factors inhibiting such investment, then the distribution of income
and wealth may become more unequal as a result of differences in investment between
rich and poor.  On the other hand, distribution may become more equal if poorer people19
are more able to make such investments because of the lower opportunity costs of their
time.
The impacts of labor-intensive land improvements on resource conditions are likely
positive in general, though this may not always be the case.  Such investments can help to
reduce erosion, reclaim degraded land, and reduce pressure on more marginal lands.  By
helping to reduce erosion, they may reduce the outflow of soil nutrients and give farmers
greater incentive to use fertilizers, manure, or other means of improving soil fertility (to
the extent that such investments and soil fertility measures are complementary).  By
helping to control runoff and conserve soil moisture, they can help to recharge
groundwater aquifers, contribute to regeneration of vegetation, and reduce problems of
flooding downstream.  However, such investments can also contribute to problems such
as accelerated runoff and downstream erosion if not properly planned or maintained.  For
example, investments in drainage from one farmer’s fields may channel runoff into a
neighbor’s fields or accelerate the rate of flow downstream.  Poorly constructed or
maintained bunds or other barriers may concentrate water flows and lead to gully
formation.  Conversely, water harvesting structures may increase the availability of water
to farmers who have constructed them at the expense of downstream water users.  Thus,
achieving positive net social (as opposed to private) benefits of such investments may
require collective action at the village level or higher, to assure that such externalities are
taken into account.20
ADOPTION OF CAPITAL INTENSIVE METHODS
Population growth may stimulate adoption of capital intensive methods of
production as well, particularly those that are complementary to labor (i.e., their
productivity is greater when combined with more labor input).  This may include use of
draft animals and farm equipment, and some types of purchased inputs.  The factors
conditioning these and their impacts may be different, so I consider them separately.
The use of draft animals and plows is likely after population density has reached a
high enough level that forest or bush fallow are no longer practiced (Pingali, Bigot and
Binswanger, 1987).  In these systems, the costs of removing tree stumps and maintenance
of animals is high, relative to the costs of using fire and hand implements to prepare
fields.  Once the transition to grass fallow has occurred, the costs of using animals and
plows are substantially reduced.  At the same time, the value of manure as a source of soil
fertility rises as fallow periods become shorter, and the availability of grass as a fodder
source increases, so that the benefits of using animals rises.  Another factor promoting
increased use of animal power and plowing is increased use of bottomlands with heavy
soils as a result of population pressure.
Other factors that condition the transition to animal draft power include climate and
disease constraints, soil conditions, market access and the extent of commercialization,
and the availability of credit.  In humid tropical climates, adoption of draft animals is
often prevented by tropical diseases, such as trypanosomiasis in humid sub-Saharan
Africa (McIntire, Bourzat and Pingali, 1992).  Adoption likely occurs earlier where the21
growing season is longer or irrigation is possible, allowing for greater capacity utilization
of draft animals and equipment (Pingali, et al. 1987).  Adoption also likely occurs earlier
where soils are heavier, as noted above.  Where markets access is good and prices of meat
are attractive, the returns to raising animals for meat as well as draft power may promote
earlier adoption (Ibid.).  Access to credit to finance animal purchases may also promote
earlier adoption of draft animals and plows, where other factors assure that their use is
profitable.
Adoption of draft animals and plowing does not necessarily increase land
productivity, but it increases labor productivity by reducing labor requirements per unit of
land (Ibid.).  If additional land is available or land can be used more intensively (for
example through irrigation and multiple cropping), the increase in labor productivity can
lead to an increase in agricultural output per capita.  Agricultural output per capita may
also rise if labor is able to migrate out of agriculture as a result of the labor savings.  Even
without an increase in production per capita of a given crop, the value of output per capita
may rise if the labor savings enables farmers to shift into higher value crops which may
require more labor and plowing.  Per capita incomes may increase even without an
increase in the value of per capita production, since labor saved may be employed in off-
farm activities. Farmers’ welfare may thus increase because of greater value of
production, off-farm income, leisure, or a combination of the three.  The distribution of
welfare benefits may be quite unequal, however, depending upon differences in farmers’
abilities to finance acquisition and maintenance of animals and implements, and in the
amount of land they operate, which will determine the extent of capacity utilization.22
After the initial benefits of adoption of draft animals and plows are realized, further
intensification of their use resulting from further population growth is likely to eventually
face diminishing returns (holding technology constant).  Thus income and welfare per
capita are not likely to continue to rise as population continues to grow, unless this
induces technological or other changes as discussed below.
The impacts of adoption of draft animals and plowing on resource conditions are
complex and mixed.  Animal manure can contribute to soil fertility, though this may be
merely recycling nutrients, if the animals are fed only crop residues and grass from
farmers’ own fields.  To the extent that animals graze or are fed materials from outside
the farm and their manure is kept on the farm, this represents a net addition to the fertility
of the soil on the farm, though this may be at the expense of soil fertility on common
grazing lands.  As livestock populations grow, overuse of such common grazing lands
may occur, particularly if their use is not adequately regulated, leading to declining
productivity of the commons.  Overgrazing can also cause serious problems of soil
compaction and erosion.  Plowing also can cause serious erosion problems, especially on
sloping lands, if adequate measures are not used to prevent it.  The demand for fodder for
growing livestock herds may induce further deforestation to clear land for grazing. 
Increasing animal numbers also increases demands on available water supplies and can
cause water pollution problems resulting from animal wastes.  At the same time, the labor
saving provided by use of draft animals can enable farmers to invest more effort in soil
and water conservation measures; while the animals may contribute labor to such efforts
as well. 23
Adoption of purchased inputs, such as chemical fertilizer, improved seeds, and
pesticides may be influenced in complex ways by population growth.  To the extent such
inputs are complementary to labor, one would expect population growth to promote their
adoption.  This may be the case with chemical fertilizer and improved seeds, though the
evidence is not clear on these.  Herbicides are more likely to be substitutes for labor, so
one would not expect population growth to promote their use, unless population growth
induces a change in farming system that favors their use.  For example, the transition
from forest to grass fallows and sedentary farming may favor adoption of herbicides,
since they may be more cost effective than burning to control weeds in the latter types of
situations.  In addition, problems of weeds and pests may increase as agricultural
intensification proceeds, as a result of declining soil fertility and diminished habitat for
the natural predators of pests.  Thus, even for inputs that are not complementary to labor,
there may be an increase in demand for their use as population grows.
Farmers’ incentive and ability to use purchased inputs in response to population
growth is largely conditioned by the returns to and risks of such inputs (determined by
agroclimatic factors, crop choice, and management practices) and the costs, accessibility,
and ability to purchase these inputs (determined by market access, extent of
commercialization, development of the input market, government policies, access to
credit and/or off-farm income, and poverty).  In drought-prone areas, use of chemical
fertilizers can be very risky, unless adequate soil moisture can be assured through
irrigation, water conservation, or other methods.  Returns to use of such inputs will
generally be higher with higher value or higher yielding crops.  In addition, many such24
crops may be more susceptible to damage by insects or weeds than more traditional
varieties, thus generating greater demand for pesticides.  Commercial production of cash
crops also facilitates access to the income needed to purchase such inputs.  This is of
course dependent upon access to markets, which also increases the availability and
reduces the costs of inputs.  Development of a competitive input market also facilitates
use of inputs.  Government policies, particularly those relating to foreign trade, exchange
rates, input subsidies and distribution, and regulation of importers, wholesalers and
retailers of agricultural inputs, can have a large impact on the development of the input
market and the availability and cost of such inputs.   Farmers’ access to credit and/or off-
farm income may determine whether and how much they are able to purchase of inputs. 
Without sufficient access to credit (and even with it), poverty may prevent farmers from
taking advantage of profitable opportunities to use inputs, due to financial constraints as
well as extreme risk aversion.
The expected impact of such inputs, where adopted, is to increase land and/or labor
productivity.  To the extent that both are increased (e.g., by improved seeds and
fertilizer), agricultural production per capita is likely to increase.  Labor saving inputs
such as herbicides may not increase land productivity directly, though the labor saved
may be used to increase land productivity by more intensive labor use in other crop
activities.  Use of purchased inputs may also enable production of higher value crops,
thus increasing the value of output per capita.  These effects will lead to increased
average welfare per capita among farmers, compared to what would occur without
adoption of such inputs.  The distribution of the benefits may be very unequal, however,25
depending upon differential access to suitable land, markets, credit and/or sufficient
income to finance such purchases.
It should be emphasized that the increase in per capita income resulting from such
capital intensification flow from the increase in capital used per farmer, and not from
population growth itself.  Improved access to markets and commercialization can induce
adoption of such practices without rural population growth, and population growth
reduces the amount of capital used per worker if production is diminishing returns to
scale (Pender, 1998).  Even in the case of constant returns to scale, a faster population
growth leads to less steady state capital intensity per worker than a slower growth rate
(Ibid.; Solow, 1956).  Thus population growth beyond the point which induces adoption
of new capital intensive technology is not expected to lead to welfare benefits (unless the
technology exhibits increasing returns to scale), even though the adoption of such
technology may yield welfare benefits.
The expected impacts of purchased inputs on natural resources are mixed. 
Increased use of chemical fertilizers can improve soil fertility, especially if used in
conjunction with measures to preserve or restore soil organic matter (Sanchez, et al.
1997).  The use of such valuable inputs can also increase farmers’ incentive to control
soil erosion, lest such valuable inputs be washed away.  The additional crop residue and
other biomass made available through improved soil conditions (as well as improved
seeds) may reduce the pressure on grazing lands and forests, by providing alternative
sources of fodder and fuel.  Additional fodder availability may in turn allow greater use of
animals, which may further improve soil fertility through manure availability.  Thus, such26
purchased inputs may help to catalyze a virtuous cycle of soil improvement and
productivity enhancement.  On the other hand, if farmers use purchased inputs as a
substitute for efforts to improve soil conditions more generally, their use may only mask
the effects of land degradation.  In this case, the vicious cycle of land degradation,
declining productivity, and poverty may continue unabated.  In addition, increased use of
agricultural chemicals (especially pesticides) without proper training and precautions can
contribute to problems of water contamination, human health problems, species
extinction, and other environmental problems.
KNOWLEDGE INTENSIFICATION
Increasing the “knowledge intensity” of agriculture, by invention of new production
technologies or adaptation of existing techniques to new conditions, is another possible
response to population pressure or other pressures.  The induced technical innovation
hypothesis (Hayami and Ruttan, 1985) posits that technical innovation taking advantage
of relatively abundant factors will be induced by changes in relative factor endowments. 
In much of the literature on induced technical innovation, innovation is seen as being
supplied primarily by agricultural research organizations.  However, farmers themselves
may also be important sources of technical innovation (Boserup, 1965, 1981; Richards,
1985).  For example, population growth may induce farmers to invent or adapt labor (and
knowledge) intensive methods, such as new indigenous soil and water conservation
measures, new organic soil fertility management practices, or integrated pest management27
 Recall Adam Smith’s famous dictum: “The division of labor is limited by the
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extent of the market”.
approaches.  It is difficult to draw a clear distinction between knowledge intensification
and simple changes in factor intensity, since many changes in labor or capital intensity
involve a strong element of adaptation and learning by doing.  Similarly, changes in
product choice or occupation (discussed below) also involve learning and adaptation, and
thus some degree of knowledge intensification.
Although the distinction between induced technical change and simple changes in
factor proportions is difficult to draw in many practical situations, the conceptual
distinction is important.  In the absence of some learning or invention, constant or
diminishing returns to scale in agriculture will imply that labor and capital intensification
will be insufficient to improve human welfare as population grows (Pender 1998). 
However, the nonrival nature of new knowledge, and positive externalities associated
with investments in human capital and learning by doing, can cause increasing returns to
scale, providing the basis for sustainable long term growth in incomes and welfare per
capita (Romer 1990; Lucas 1988; Arrow, 1962).  If there are increasing returns to scale,
population growth may contribute to more rapid technical change and welfare
improvement if it enables economies of scale and specialization to be realized.    For
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example, the per capita costs of inventing a new method of production will decline with
population growth, since the total costs of such invention are likely unaffected by
population growth.  If mechanisms are in place (or are induced to develop) to share such28
costs or internalize the external benefits among a growing population, technical
innovation is likely to occur simply because the per capita costs are declining.
Whether population growth does in fact lead to technical innovation thus depends
critically upon whether institutional or organizational mechanisms exist to allow such
economies of scale and positive externalities to be realized.  One way to do this is by
taxing people to pay for the costs of agricultural research or experimentation.  This is of
course an important response at the national or state level, but is likely limited at the local
level.  Sharing costs and risks of innovation at the local level may occur through local
farmer organizations, such as community mutual support groups or savings and credit
groups that serve to pool risks.  Another approach is to compensate farmer innovators for
some or all of the external benefits that arise from innovations.  For many kinds of
innovation in developed countries, this is done by assigning intellectual property rights
(e.g., patents and copyrights).  However, such formal mechanisms likely are of limited
applicability to most of the subtle and often site-specific innovations that farmers in
developing countries generate, and the transaction costs of such formal approaches are
likely prohibitive.  But less formal mechanisms to reward innovators may be quite
important, such as providing them greater status in the community, prizes through local
production contests, etc.  Many factors affect the prospects for such institutional or
organizational development.  These factors are considered below in the discussion of
collective responses.  
The impacts of knowledge intensification in agriculture for agricultural
productivity and human welfare are expected to be positive.  Total factor productivity is29
expected to increase, so that the average productivity of labor, land, and capital may all
increase.  This can increase income per capita directly as well as by promoting greater
investment in land and/or capital (since returns to investment will increase).  The
distribution of benefits will depend upon how (and how much) innovators are
compensated, how widely knowledge of the innovation spreads, and how applicable the
innovation is to different farmers’ circumstances.  Where innovators are compensated
more through status or other non-economic mechanisms, where information is widely
available, and where the innovation is applicable to a wide range of circumstances, the
economic benefits of innovation will be more widely distributed.
The impacts of innovation on resource conditions will depend of course on the
nature of the innovation as well as other factors, and may be mixed.  For example,
development of a new technology that increases the profitability of farming may reduce
pressure on forests if the technology is more suited to labor-intensive production than to
extensive production, if the elasticity of demand for food is low and the technology
increases food production, or if labor supply is relatively inelastic (Angelsen and
Kaimowitz, 1998).  Conversely, if the technology reduces the cost of clearing forests or if
factor supplies and output demand are elastic, the increased profitability of farming may
lead to increased deforestation.  To the extent that innovations are induced by factor
scarcity, one would expect population growth to result in labor using, land saving
innovations, which should promote land improvement.  Soil fertility should therefore tend
to be enhanced and soil erosion reduced by population induced innovation.  However, as
mentioned earlier, such land improvements will depend critically upon the security of30
land tenure, and on other factors such as local agroecological conditions and the extent of
commercialization.  Since scarcity of other resources such as water also increases with
population growth, induced innovation is likely to emphasize conservation or
improvement of water supplies as well.
CHANGES IN PRODUCT MIX
Population growth may also induce changes in the mix of products produced by
farmers.  Increases in labor to land ratios make adoption of products requiring greater
labor intensity and producing higher returns per unit of land likely.  At lower levels of
population density, population growth may induce a change from extensive livestock or
cereal production to integrated crop-livestock systems that use labor more intensively and
take advantage of complementarities between crop and livestock production (McIntire, et
al., 1992).  At higher levels of population density, further population growth may induce a
return to specialization as a result of increasing competition between crops and livestock
for land and water, and development of infrastructure and markets making specialization
more profitable (Ibid.).  Adoption of highly labor-intensive crops, such as rice or
vegetables under irrigated conditions, may enable much fuller utilization of available land
but leave less land or labor available for the maintenance of livestock (except perhaps
draft animals).  On the other hand, intensive livestock operations, such as commercial
dairy or poultry operations, may develop in areas close to urban markets as population
density rises to high levels.  31
Many of the factors conditioning the transition from specialized extensive crop or
livestock production to integrated crop-livestock systems were discussed above, in
discussing adoption of draft animals.  Topography, soils, climate conditions and the
extent of infrastructure and market development condition the comparative advantage of
specialized crop or livestock production relative to integrated systems.  Where
topographic and/or soil conditions are not well suited to plowing (e.g., on steep slopes),
adoption of draft animals may be limited.  Good access to roads and urban markets, or
significant local variations in comparative advantage, will favor continued specialization
and trade as population grows, particularly at higher population densities where problems
of competition between crops and livestock become more severe.  The transition to
intensive irrigated crops of course depends upon the potential for irrigation as well as the
availability of inputs such as fertilizer, seeds and pesticides, access to credit, and access to
markets (particularly for perishable crops such as vegetables).  Development of
commercial dairy or poultry production depends upon the availability of low cost feed, as
well as close proximity to markets.  Particularly with perishable products such as milk or
vegetables, development of organizations (such as cooperatives) or institutional
mechanisms (such as contract farming) to ensure access to inputs and credit, an assured
market for sellers, and quality control for buyers, may be very important.
As with adoption of more labor-intensive methods of production, adoption of more
labor-intensive products can be expected to increase the value of output per unit of land,
but may be associated with reduced value per unit of labor input, unless some element of
learning or technological change is associated with the change in product mix.  Where32
shifts in product mix are brought about by new opportunities, such as new technology,
development of infrastructure, or expansion of markets for high value products, increases
in the value of labor as well as land are likely.  Only in such cases can one expect the shift
in product mix to improve incomes per capita and welfare, and population growth will be
responsible for the improvement only to the extent that it led to the expansion of such
opportunities.
The impacts of changes in product mix on resources can be complex.  The adoption
of more labor-intensive products can be expected to reduce pressure on forests or other
marginal lands, as long as the supply of labor is not perfectly elastic.  Adoption of such
products may involve better management of land in some respects.  For example,
investments in soil and water conservation structures may be promoted by adoption of
irrigated crops (Pender and Kerr, 1998).  On the other hand, continuous multiple cropping
of such crops may create problems for soil fertility and structure, while frequent plowing
may cause problems of severe soil erosion.  Problems of soil fertility and structure may be
aggravated as integrated crop-livestock systems are replaced by specialized crop
production at high population density, since reduced availability of manure may reduce
soil organic matter and nutrients.  Farmers may compensate for reduced manure by using
chemical fertilizers, but this may not address the problems associated with low soil
organic matter.  Increased use of fertilizers and pesticides in such intensive crop systems
also may cause water quality and health problems, as mentioned previously.33
CHANGES IN OCCUPATION AND MIGRATION
Declining land availability and labor productivity resulting from population growth
may induce people to seek alternative sources of income.  At the same time, development
of infrastructure and markets, and the process of agricultural intensification itself may
create new opportunities for non-farm employment.  For example, adoption of plows or
other implements will generate demand for tool makers.  Opportunities for specialization
and trade will increase as the size of the potential market grows, as originally argued by
Adam Smith.  While many opportunities may develop within rural communities, a large
share of the new opportunities will likely occur in developing urban centers, facilitating
rural to urban migration.  
Key factors influencing this response include education and training opportunities,
labor mobility, land tenure security, land and housing markets, the development of
infrastructure, the pace of investment and growth in the industrial sector of the economy,
the presence of social services in the urban sector, and poverty.  Education and training
are obviously important for more skilled occupations.  Labor mobility is of course
necessary for rural people to take advantage of non-farm employment opportunities in
urban areas.  Such mobility may be inhibited by explicit policies to restrict migration
(e.g., requirements of residence permits), but may also be retarded by the absence of
housing in urban areas, land tenure insecurity that may arise by leaving the rural area,
limited ability to sell or lease out farmland, poor living conditions and social services in
urban areas, or the risks associated with migration, which may be very high for very poor
people.  Many of these factors may cut the other way, however.  Displaced people from34
rural areas may find it easier to establish squatters’ rights in urban shantytowns than in
less anonymous rural communities.  Poverty and desperation may drive people to such
areas, despite the risks.  Urban biased policies, better social services and/or higher wages
in urban areas may attract migrants to urban areas, even if unemployment is greater there
(Lipton, 1977; Harris and Todaro, 1970).   
Movement of labor out of agriculture and into other occupations can have positive
impacts on productivity in agriculture.  By reducing the stock of labor in agriculture,
average productivity of the labor (but not of land) remaining in agriculture should
increase, unless surplus labor exists in the agriculture sector (Lewis, 1954).  To the extent
that labor shifts into other occupations with productive linkages to agriculture (such as
supplying tools or production inputs), this can also contribute to productivity
improvement.  By increasing off-farm demand for food and other agricultural products,
migration out of agriculture can stimulate market development and increase relative
prices of agricultural products, promoting investment in farm improvement.  Off-farm
employment by rural residents or by family members in urban areas can provide a source
of income and savings to finance purchase of inputs or investments in agriculture
(Reardon, Crawford and Kelly, 1994).  These effects are expected to contribute to
increased per capita incomes and generally increased welfare in rural areas. 
Distributional impacts will favor those with less or no land, since wages will tend to rise
relative to land rents as a result of employment of labor outside of agriculture.  
There can also be negative impacts on agriculture and resource management as
well.  As off-farm opportunities and rural wages increase, labor-intensive investments in35
 The effect of increased wages on land investment may be offset may the
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liquidity-enhancing effect of off-farm income, which may enable farmers with off-farm
income to hire workers to make investments (Pender and Kerr, 1998; Clay, et al. 1998).
land management and improvement become less attractive, and even existing investments
may be less well maintained.   As a result, existing systems of production may become
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unsustainable, and a process of agricultural dis-intensification may occur (Goldman,
1995).  The qualitative impacts of this on natural resource conditions may be the opposite
of the impacts of agricultural intensification (both positive and negative).  For example,
labor-intensive methods of soil fertility management (such as composting or mulching)
may be abandoned and soil and water conservation structures may not be maintained,
contributing to reduced soil fertility and increased erosion in the near term.  However, if
dis-intensification leads to a return to longer-term fallows, it may result in regeneration of
soil fertility and woody vegetation in the longer term.  The point, well articulated by
Goldman (Ibid.), is that changes in population density may change what constitutes
sustainable agricultural practices.  Once agricultural systems and practices adjust to the
new circumstances, the system may again become sustainable, although substantial
resource degradation may occur during the transition from one system to another.36
 I do not consider mortality rates to be a choice variable for households, but
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rather something they try to minimize.  Thus mortality rates may respond to population
growth, as originally argued by Malthus, but are not properly considered a household
behavioral response.
CHANGES IN HOUSEHOLD FERTILITY DECISIONS
The final household level response to population growth that I consider is change in
household fertility decisions.   According to the modern economic theory of fertility
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decisions, fertility is determined by the interaction of demand and supply factors. 
Households’ demand for children is influenced by the costs of raising, caring for, and
educating children; the economic benefits that they may provide the household over their
lifetime (including their contribution to household income and providing old age security
for parents); and of course the non-economic benefits or costs that people associate with
children (Becker and Lewis, 1974; Schultz, 1981).  The supply of children is influenced
by biological factors that may be influenced by the nutrition and health of women
(Easterlin, 1980).  
Population growth may have effects on both demand and supply factors, many of
which suggest that population growth should induce declining fertility.  If population
growth results in lower wages and less available open access resources that can be readily
exploited, the benefits of having many children may tend to decrease.  As resource and
food supplies become scarce, the costs of raising children are also increased.  If
population growth is a result of declining child mortality, parents will find that they need
to have fewer children to ensure that some will survive, be productive and contribute to
their old age security, and may decide to substitute “quality” for “quantity” (Becker and37
Lewis).  To the extent that population growth increases poverty and reduces the nutrition
and health of women, this may also induce declining fertility for biological reasons
(Easterlin).  Furthermore, if children are seen as an investment with near term costs and
long term benefits, population-induced poverty may reduce fertility by increasing the
discount rate and shortening households’ time horizon.
However, there are many factors that may cause fertility rates not to decline as a
response to population growth.  Continuing poverty may cause parents to continue to
desire a large number of children to ensure their old age security, even if child mortality
rates fall.  Children may be seen as more productive assets in farming than in other
occupations; thus the demand for children may remain high as long as farming is the
dominant activity of households.  Agricultural intensification and technical change may
increase the productive benefit of having children and thus slow the decline in fertility
(Vosti, Witcover and Lipton, 1994).  Low education levels and status of women may
continue to foster early marriage and child-bearing.  Lack of information or access to
family planning options may limit the ability of households to convert a decline in
demand for children to a decline in fertility.  Religious and cultural norms about family
size, land inheritance rules, and other socio-cultural factors may also inhibit a fertility
response (Ibid.).
To the extent that a decline in fertility occurs as a result of population growth, this
will tend to mitigate any of the impacts of increased population size discussed above.  An38
 The impact on age structure of an acceleration in population growth caused by a
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decline in mortality at the beginning of a demographic transition is just the reverse of the
impact of a decline in fertility.  The impacts of such a change in age structure will thus be
the opposite of those considered here.
additional effect is to change the age distribution of the population.   In the near term, a
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decline in fertility will reduce the dependency ratio, leading to increased production and
welfare per capita.  This will increase households’ ability to save and invest, which also
contributes to growth in income and welfare per capita.  This increase in income and
savings per capita will help to ensure the old age security of parents, and will be needed
since they will have fewer children in the working population as a result of declining
fertility.  To the extent that parents invest in greater quality of education and health care
of their children as a result of substituting “quality for quantity”, there may be an
intergenerational transfer of wealth from parents to children.
The impacts of the changing age structure following a decline in fertility on
resources are likely to be generally positive, though there may be negative impacts as
well.  By enabling greater investment, this will encourage investment (per capita) in
improved natural resources as well as other forms of capital, particularly if different
forms of capital are complementary (Pender, 1998).  Increased wealth per capita may
reduce households’ discount rates and increase their access to credit, and thus also
promote investment in resources (Pender 1996).  Increased investment in children’s
education may lead to a greater awareness of resource and environmental problems.  On
the other hand, increased wealth and education may cause people to have higher
opportunity costs of labor and better alternative investment opportunities than to invest in39
land or other resource improvement.  The positive effects of the changing age structure
and dependency ratio on investment in resource improvement may be offset by increasing
wages, which will reduce incentives to make labor-intensive investments.  Thus, as with
most other responses, the predicted impacts of fertility decline on resource conditions are
mixed.
3.  COLLECTIVE RESPONSES TO RURAL POPULATION GROWTH
The responses to population growth that may occur at a community or higher level
include investments in infrastructure, changes in collective action to manage resources
(e.g., management of common property resources), changes in institutions (e.g., property
rights and land tenure arrangements, development of markets), and changes in
organization and social roles (e.g., establishment of organizations to protect common
resources or achieve economies of scale in marketing).  Our hypotheses about these
responses are summarized in Table 2.
INVESTMENTS IN INFRASTRUCTURE
Investments in rural infrastructure may be promoted by population growth.  The
costs of infrastructure such as roads, irrigation systems, and electricity networks are
largely fixed costs, so that the costs per capita decline as population grows (Boserup,
1965).  As with technical innovation (discussed previously), the ability to take advantage40
of such economies of scale will depend critically upon the development of institutions
and organizations.  Thus, the development of cost sharing mechanisms, such as a tax
system or collective investment in infrastructure development, is needed.  The potential
for local collective action to achieve these scale economies is of course much greater for
investments that do not require much technical input or sophisticated capital (e.g.,
construction rural feeder roads or hand dug wells).  A functioning  system of public
finance will be necessary to finance more technological and/or capital intensive projects
such as large dams and electricity networks.  The factors determining such institutional
and organizational development (discussed below) are thus critical.
Infrastructure development (particularly roads and irrigation) can have large
positive impacts on agricultural productivity and rural incomes by increasing access to
and reducing costs of inputs, increasing farm level prices of outputs, providing access to
irrigation water, enabling production of higher value perishable products, improving
access to technical assistance and education, increasing specialization and trade, and
increasing off-farm employment opportunities.  Thus, rural welfare will tend to increase
in general, though there may be adverse distributional impacts.  Households with land41
Table 2  Hypotheses about collective responses to rural population growth
Response Conditioning Factors
Productivity Human Welfare Natural Resource Conditions
Land Labor Income Welfare/ Dist. of Forest Soil Soil Water
/Capita Welfare Erosion Fertility Capita
Investments in - Growing population (reduced per capita costs) 0 0 0 0 +/- +/- +/- +/- +/-
infrastructure - Mechanisms to share costs (collective action,
institutional and/or organizational development)
Collective action to - Moderate population density (economies of scale +/- +/- 0 0 +/- +/- +/- +/- +/-
manage resources in protection, diseconomies in collective
management)
- Moderate population growth (stability of resource
users group)
-Extent of externalities
-Transaction costs of private bargaining
-Number and heterogeneity of resource users
-Geographic and social proximity of users
- Time horizons of users
- Risks and risk aversion
- Norms of cooperation or equity
- Presence of organizations42
Table 2  Hypotheses about collective responses to rural population growth (continued)
Response Conditioning Factors
Productivity Human Welfare Natural Resource Conditions
Land Labor Income Welfare/ Dist. of Forest Soil Soil Water
/Capita Welfare Erosion Fertility Capita
Institutional change - Changes in factor scarcity (induced +/- +/- 0 0 +/- +/- +/- +/- +/-
institutional innovation)
- Changes in technology/opportunities
- Private costs and benefits of political
entrepreneurs, powerful groups
- Collective action and organizational change
- Cultural factors (e.g., norms of equity,
cooperation, religion, ideology)
- Education
Organizational change  - Similar to factors affecting collective action +/- +/- 0 0 +/- +/- +/- +/- +/-
and institutional change43
displaced by road or irrigation projects may not be adequately compensated. 
Construction of irrigation projects may increase access to water for upstream users at the
expense of downstream users.  Differential access to roads or irrigation may increase the
inequality of income, and promote acquisition of land or other resources by advantaged
farmers at the expense of poorer ones.  The extent to which such negative impacts arise
and are compensated depends upon the nature of the process used to decide on, plan and
implement them.  The more the process includes potentially affected people, the more
likely that negative distributional impacts can be avoided.  There may be a trade-off
however, between avoiding negative distributional impacts and achieving aggregate
social gains, since transaction costs, imperfect information and incentive problems may
limit the ability to identify and adequately compensate losers.
The impacts of infrastructure development on resource conditions may be very
mixed.  Where roads or other infrastructure are established near forest areas, they may
promote deforestation if open access land exists, farmers are acting as profit maximizers,
immigration is relatively easy, and the elasticity of demand for the agricultural products
from these areas is high (Angelsen, 1996).  On the other hand, if farmers are subsistence
oriented, labor is locally constrained, or the elasticity of demand for agricultural
production is low, increased production made possible by increased access to roads or
irrigation may cause farmers to intensify production on a smaller area of land, thus
reducing pressure on forests or marginal lands (Ibid.).  The increased value of land caused
by infrastructure development will tend to promote labor-intensive investment in land
conservation and improvement if land values rise more than wages.  It will also tend to44
 If wages fall as a result of declining labor productivity resulting from population
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growth, this will also tend to reduce the costs of organizing.
promote greater capital intensity, unless improved market access increases people’s
investment opportunities elsewhere to a greater extent than locally.  Knowledge intensity
in agriculture is also likely to increase as a result of improved access to markets,
information, technical assistance and education.  Increases in labor, capital and
knowledge intensity and shifts in product mix and occupations brought about by
infrastructural development can have both positive and negative impacts on resources and
the environment, as discussed earlier.
CHANGES IN COLLECTIVE ACTION
Population growth may cause changes in collective action related to natural
resources at the community or other levels.  At very low levels of population density, the
relative abundance of land and other resources may require little action (whether
collective or private) to manage resources.  As population grows, increasing scarcity
increases the potential rents that can be achieved by protecting and intensively managing
land and other resources.  At the same time, the costs of organizing may fall as population
density grows from low levels, as people begin to live closer together (Templeton and
Scherr, 1997).   Economies of scale in protecting resources at a collective rather than
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private level may outweigh incentive problems associated with collective (relative to
private) management at low to moderate levels of population density, particularly since
management and investment requirements may be fairly limited when intensity of45
resource use is still relatively low.  Thus establishment of common property resources
with collective protection and management may become the optimal strategy for
managing scarce resources as population density grows to moderate levels.
As population density grows to high levels, the benefits and costs of collective
action relative to private action may begin to change.  The beneficial effect of increasing
population density in reducing organizational costs will decline in importance where
people already live in close proximity.  At the same time, the need to organize larger
numbers of people and the increasing scarcity of resources will make attaining collective
action more difficult, since the costs of monitoring and enforcement and the benefits of
violating collective restrictions on resource use will be rising.  As resource management
and investment requirements become greater with increasing use intensity, the incentive
problems associated with collective (relative to private) management will increase. 
Eventually, the net benefits of private management will exceed the benefits of collective
management as population grows, promoting a shift in management systems.  This shift
may occur without a shift to private property--economies of scale in resource protection
may favor keeping resources under communal ownership, even though they may be
privately managed. 
As management decisions become increasingly private in nature, externalities
caused by private management decisions of households (e.g., impacts of irrigation or
drainage investments by upstream farmers on downstream farmers) may still require some
form of collective action, unless transactions costs are sufficiently low that bargaining
between rights holders to resolve the externalities is feasible (Coase, 1960).  The46
 Note that homogeneity of wealth does not necessarily imply homogeneity of
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interests, and wealth heterogeneity may favor collective action (Olson, 1965; Baland and
Platteau, 1996).  
transactions costs of such an approach may be prohibitive for externalities that affect
large numbers of people, and such externalities may proliferate as population density and
intensive land management increases.  Thus, collective action may evolve from collective
protection and management of resources towards regulating or taxing specific types of
negative externalities or promoting specific community level investments that generate
positive externalities (e.g., community watershed management investments).
The ability to attain collective action in managing resources may depend upon
many factors, including the nature of the resource, the nature of the uses of the resource,
the nature of the users of the resource, and the existing institutional and organizational
strucure within the community (Ostrom, 1990; Rasmussen and Meinzen-Dick, 1995). 
Collective resource management is more likely to arise and be effective where costs of
exclusion are lower but economies of scale in exclusion exist (thus inhibiting
privatization); where the benefits of cooperation relative to non-cooperation are greater;
where there are fewer users; where the interests of users are more homogeneous;  where
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membership in the users group is less open and more stable; where users are closer to one
another physically and socially; where users have longer time horizons; where risks and
risk aversion increase the benefits of pooling risks; where norms of cooperation and/or
equity exist among users; or where there already exist cooperative organizations upon
which efforts to attain collective action can build (Ibid.; Baland and Platteau, 1996).47
Population growth may promote collective action through its effects on many of
these factors.  It may reduce the per capita costs of protection of the resource, if there are
economies of scale in this.  It tends to increase the benefits of cooperation, since it
increases the scarcity rents achievable by good management.  It may increase the
geographic and social proximity of resource users by increasing population density.  
On the other hand, population growth also may detract from collective action for
many reasons.  Since it increases resource rents, it also increases the benefits to be gained
by cheating on collective agreements. It increases the number of resource users and
perhaps their diversity of interests.  It reduces the stability of membership of the users
group, particularly if population growth is rapid and/or there is significant immigration or
emigration from the community.  Related to this, population growth may also undermine
group stability and incentives to cooperate to the extent that it promotes infrastructure and
market development.  To the extent that population growth increases poverty, it may
cause people to have higher discount rates and shorter time horizons.  Increasing scarcity
and rapid population change may erode norms of cooperation and equity, particularly
where migration and commercialization are substantial.
As I have argued above, the balance of these factors is expected to weigh in favor
of collective action at moderate levels of population density and growth.  However, at
very high levels of population density or growth, the factors tending to undermine
collective action appear likely to dominate.  Thus, we may observe an inverted U-shaped
relationship between population density or population growth and collective action for
resource management.48
To the extent that collective action for natural resource management follows from
increased demands generated by population growth, it will tend to promote greater
welfare and improved resource conditions for the members of the collective, although this
may involve some near term sacrifice on the part of individuals for the sake of greater
collective gains.  However, there may be adverse distributional impacts on weaker
members of the collective groups, or on outsiders.  For example, collective grazing
restrictions may be established that allow farmers to cut and carry fodder grasses to feed
draft animals, but limit access of goats and sheep to grazing areas.  Such restrictions may
benefit the wealthier members of the community at the expense of poorer ones, who may
own fewer draft animals and may be more dependent upon small ruminants for their
livelihoods.  There can also be adverse impacts on resources outside of those collectively
managed.  For example, establishment of a protected grazing area as mentioned above
may increase grazing pressure on unprotected areas.  Thus collective action may displace
rather than solve resource management and poverty problems, unless the action is
sufficiently encompassing of affected groups and resources.49
INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE
Closely related to the development of collective action is the prospect of
institutional change, particularly regarding changes in property rights and land tenure
relations.  As population pressure and intensity of land use increase, the demand for more
secure rights to specific pieces of land or other resources will increase (Boserup, 1965;
Demsetz, 1967; Ault and Rutman, 1979; Binswanger and McIntire, 1987; Platteau, 1996). 
This demand may be accommodated within customary land tenure systems by allowing
households long term use and inheritance rights to specific resources.  As relative factor
scarcities change, the demand for land and other factor transactions may increase.  Land
leasing and sharecropping may arise, allowing more efficient use of available factors of
production, which may differ across households.  Where capital intensification is
occurring, increased demand for credit will increase the demand to be able to mortgage
land.  Customary rights to mortgage or even sell land may evolve (Platteau, 1996).  In
short, customary land rights may evolve from communal to more private forms.  This
evolution may proceed without external intervention, although it is often assumed that
formal land titling arrangements are necessary for this process to occur (Ibid.).  
The demand for other forms of institutional innovation are likely to increase as
population grows as well.  In addition to land markets, other markets are also likely to
arise.  Markets for labor are likely to develop as increasing land scarcity causes land poor
households to seek employment elsewhere, whether on other farms or in off-farm
activities (particularly where land quantity or quality are unevenly distributed).  Markets
for capital inputs, such as draft animals, farm equipment, and purchased inputs, are also50
likely to develop as the demand for such inputs develops.  The demand for credit services
will also increase as the use of capital inputs increases.  As labor moves out of agriculture
and into other activities, increased trade in food and other agricultural products will be
needed, promoting development of product markets.  To the extent that population
growth promotes investment in transportation infrastructure, this will also help to
promote commercialization and market development.
The demand for non-market institutions may also rise as population grows
(Hayami and Ruttan, 1985).  For example, the demand for regulation of the use of
resources is likely to increase as population pressure increases externality costs.  The
demand for institutions to share the costs of infrastructure investment, which will be
declining on a per capita basis as population grows, will also increase.  Similarly, the
demand for institutions to share the costs of agricultural innovation or internalize some of
the positive externalities resulting from innovation will also be growing as population
grows.
Many factors condition whether the supply of institutional innovation is consistent
with the changing demand (Ibid.).  Where political entrepeneurship is needed to bring
about institutional change, the factors influencing the private costs, benefits and risks
faced by such entrepeneurs are likely to be critical.  The relative power of particular
interest groups may prevent institutional changes from occurring, even if their potential
net social benefits may be very high.  For example, a shift from communal to private
property rights may be prevented by a village chief, whose power and status would be
reduced by losing the ability to allocate land rights.  Conversely, “rent seeking” forms of51
institutional innovation may occur where these serve the interests of powerful groups,
despite the fact that they may not promote greater welfare in general.  It has been argued
that land titling efforts are sometimes of this nature, providing an opportunity for well
connected elites to claim land used by weaker or less well informed households
(Platteau).   Cultural factors may also have a strong impact on the supply of
institutional innovation (Hayami and Ruttan).  For example, cultures which foster strong
norms of cooperation and reciprocity are likely to find it easier than other cultures to
develop institutions to share the costs of infrastructural development or innovation.  On
the other hand, strong egalitarian norms may cause animosity towards complete
privatization of property rights, particularly the elimination of common lands available to
the poorest people, or the alienation of an individual’s right to land through sale or
foreclosure on a mortgage (Platteau).  Education may also have a strong influence on the
receptivity of people to institutional innovation, and on the likelihood that the innovations
that come about are efficiency improving (Hayami and Ruttan).  
Clearly there is much more to institutional change than a simple response to
changes in net social benefits.  Much of the challenge in understanding modern economic
history is in understanding why institution innovations that promote greater efficiency and
economic development are adopted in some circumstances while seemingly inefficient
institutions persist over very long periods in others (North, 1990).  The role of differential
power relations, cultural factors, education, and other location specific conditioning
factors may explain a large fraction of the variance in outcomes.  But North also pointed
to the nature of the process of institutional innovation itself as a source of divergence. 52
Institutions condition the nature of expectations and the range of permissible activities,
and those expectations and activities may reinforce the strength of the institutions.  Thus
institutional change may be a self-reinforcing process characterized by multiple
equilibrium outcomes and path dependency (Ibid.).  Even small differences in initial
conditions between different societies may lead to large and persistent differences in their
pathways of institutional change.  Thus, for example, the pressure of population growth
may lead to a smooth transition from common property to private property in some
circumstances, while in others the pressure may cause a breakdown in the common
property system leading towards unregulated open access.  Differences in people’s initial
expectations about the path that development may take and their assurance that others
will respect property rights may account for the differential outcomes.  The differences in
impacts on natural resource conditions and human welfare between these different
scenarios may be very extreme.
In general, the impacts of institutional change for welfare and resource conditions
will be via its impacts on the conditioning factors affecting all of the previous responses
considered.  Thus, for example, development of more private and secure property rights
will inhibit extensification, favor investments in land improvements, promote use of
inputs (to the extent that private land rights promote access to credit) and perhaps
facilitate migration and changes in occupations.  The expected impacts of all of these
changes on human welfare and resource conditions are, as we have seen, diverse.  In
general, however, to the extent that institutional innovation is responding to changes in53
net social (as opposed to private) benefits, it will lead to increases in general welfare,
although there may be adverse distributional consequences.
ORGANIZATIONAL CHANGE
Also closely related to collective action and institutional change is organizational
change, which may also be stimulated by population growth.  Following Uphoff (1986), I
distinguish organizations, defined as “structures of recognized and accepted roles” from
institutions, defined as “complexes of norms and behaviors that persist over time”.  One
may see the roles established in organizations as largely determined by the nature of
institutions and technology, since these will tend to define the set of possible roles that
may be served by organizational structures and the costs and returns of alternative
structures.  However, technological and institutional change may also be affected by
organizational change.  For example, establishment of farmers’ cooperatives may reduce
the costs or increase the benefits of extending new technologies and thus promote greater
technical innovation.  The presence of cooperatives may also facilitate institutional
innovation; for example, they may facilitate collective action needed to establish effective
regulation of externalities caused by private farming practices.  
Population growth is expected to affect organizational development for most of
the same reasons that it may affect collective action and institutional development.  Since
organizational development requires collective action, the factors affecting collective
action are also relevant for organizational development.  Factors favoring collective54
action, such as the homogeneity of interests of the members, the stability of the group,
proximity of the members, the ability to exclude outsiders, etc., will also tend to favor
organizational development by reducing the costs of such development.  The demand for
new types of organizations serving different functions will also tend to increase as
population grows and new economic roles are required.  For example, increased use of
capital inputs in agriculture may promote not only new institutions such as mortgageable
land and markets for such inputs, but it also requires new organizations such as rural
banks and input wholesalers and traders.  
As with institutional development, organizational development may be affected
by power relations, cultural and other factors, and may be subject to path dependency as
well.  Also, organizational development may not be socially beneficial even where it
benefits the members, since organizations may arise to serve rent-seeking motives rather
than efficiency enhancement (Olson, 1982).  Thus the impacts of organizational
development on welfare and natural resources may be quite diverse.  Organizations such
as water or pasture users groups may improve the management of common property
resources for the benefit of all.  On the other hand, such groups may be dominated by
powerful elites who use the organization as a way of capturing rents for themselves at the
expense of other members or those who may be excluded from the group.  As with
institutional development, organizational development will improve social welfare to the
extent that it responds to efficiency motives, although there may be adverse distributional
implications.55
SUMMARY
To summarize the hypotheses, I have argued that population growth may stimulate
a wide variety of responses at the household and collective level.  Many of these
responses are strongly conditioned by the nature of technology, infrastructure, institutions
and organizations.  In the absence of development of these factors, population growth is
likely to lead to declining labor productivity and human welfare, as a result of
diminishing returns.  The expected impacts on resource conditions are more mixed and
dependent upon the conditioning factors, with population growth inducing agricultural
extensification and deforestation in low population density settings with open access land
available, but promoting labor-intensive investments in land improvement at higher
population densities where land tenure is secure.
The larger impacts of population growth in the long term may be via its impacts
on development of technology, infrastructure, institutions and organizations.  As
emphasized in the literature on induced innovation, population growth may reduce the per
capita costs and increase the benefits of innovations in these different areas, leading to
welfare and resource improving changes.  However, the supply of such innovations and
their impacts may be very dependent upon the distribution of wealth and power, cultural
factors, education, and other context specific conditions, and these developments may be
subject to a substantial degree of path dependency.   Thus, very large differences in the
impacts of population growth for agricultural productivity, human welfare, and natural
resource conditions may occur in communities and households embarked upon different
pathways of development.  Much of the challenge of empirical policy research on these56
 This section is based on Pender, Scherr and Duron (1999) and Pender and Scherr
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(1999).
issues is to identify the factors that lead to different pathways of institutional and
technological change, and policy interventions that may help more productive, welfare-
enhancing and resource-improving pathways to evolve.
Given the importance of so many complex and site specific conditioning factors
and the possibility of path dependence in responses, the impacts of rural population
pressure may be very different in different contexts.  I now consider evidence of such
impacts in the context of the hillsides of central Honduras.
4.  EVIDENCE FROM CENTRAL HONDURAS
Recent research conducted by IFPRI in hillside communities of central Honduras
provides evidence on some of the hypotheses discussed above.   The central hillsides
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region of Honduras was defined to include all municipios (counties) of the Department of
Francisco Morazan except two valley communities and five adjacent hillside municipios
of the Department of El Paraíso.  This region is relatively homogeneous in terms of
topography (over 90% hillsides), climate (mainly sub-humid tropical), and soils
(generally thin and of poor quality).  It includes substantial variation in population
density, access to markets, and agricultural practices.  Rural population density in the
region is generally low, averaging 25 persons/km  in 1988, though it ranged from as low
257
as 9 to as high as 87 persons/ km  in some municipios.  Many villages in the region lack
2
access to a road, requiring up to a half-day by foot or pack animal to reach the nearest
road, while many others are located near to paved highways and close to Tegucigalpa, the
capital of Honduras.  There are serious problems of resource degradation and poverty in
the region.
METHODS
The evidence is based on a survey of 48 villages in the central region of Honduras,
selected through a random sample stratified by population density and distance to the
dominant market in the region (Tegucigalpa).  The survey collected information about
changes in agriculture and natural resource management between 1975 and 1996, and
about the causes and effects of those changes.  The survey included a group questionnaire
and participatory mapping of community boundaries and resources, augmented by
analysis of available aerial photographs, maps, and village level data from the 1974 and
1988 population censuses.
Econometric analysis was used to identify the factors influencing changes in
agriculture and natural resource management, and the impacts of those factors on
indicators of changes in outcomes, including agricultural productivity, poverty, and
natural resource conditions.  The response variables analyzed included (among others)
indicators of agricultural extensification (change in forest area between 1975 and 1996),
change in fallow use, labor intensification (change in use of burning, use of various soil58
 Six development pathways were identified based on information on change in
9
occupation and product choice, including  1) expansion of basic grains production, 2)
stagnation of basic grains production, 3) adoption and expansion of horticultural
production, 4) expansion of coffee production, 5) specialization in forestry, and 6) high
and increasing importance of non-farm employment.  Basic grains production was
important in all of the surveyed communities; communities were distinguished more by
the other occupations/product choices.  See Pender, Scherr and Duron (1999) for more
details on the classification of communities by development pathway.
fertility management practices in 1996), labor-intensive land investments since 1975
(terraces, live barriers, stone walls, tree planting), capital intensification (change in use of
oxen, plows, and purchased inputs), change in product mix or occupation (classification
of communities by “development pathway”, based on information on occupation and
product mix),  collective action (whether or not the community had invested collectively
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in improving common lands or controlling runoff), and local organizational development
(number of local organizations).  The outcome variables analyzed included indicators of
land and labor productivity (levels and changes in maize yields and wages), poverty
(levels and changes in percentage of households with a dirt floor and percentage of
households whose last child died), and natural resource conditions (land use on steep
lands and perceived changes in cropland quality, forest quality, water availability and
water quality).
The econometric model used was determined by the nature of the dependent
variable.  In most cases, the dependent variables were measured as ordinal variables,
either representing a change between 1975 and 1996 (e.g., whether use of a particular
practice had increased, stayed the same, or declined; whether the condition of a particular
type of resource had improved, stayed the same, or degraded) or the condition of the59
variable in 1996 (e.g., an ordinal index representing the extent of adoption of particular
conservation measures, ranging from 0 (no one uses) to 6 (everyone uses)).  Ordered
probit analysis was used to analyze the factors affecting such dependent variables.  In
some cases (e.g., changes in wages and indicators of poverty), the dependent variables
were measured as continuous variables, and least squares estimation was used.  In one
case (collective action) the dependent variable was measured as a binary discrete choice;
binary probit analysis was used in this case.  In one other case (pathway of development),
the dependent variable is a choice among several discrete outcomes, and multinomial
logit analysis was used. 
The variables used to explain determinants of development pathways included
factors affecting agricultural potential (altitude and number of rainfall days), population
density, access to markets (distance to the urban market and to the nearest road), and
access to technology (presence of a technical assistance program since 1975).  The
variables used to explain changes in household agricultural practices and changes in
outcomes included the development pathways, change in population density, whether
road access had improved or stayed the same since 1975, change in the adult literacy rate
between 1974 and 1988, and the presence of various types of agricultural programs
(technical assistance, credit, agrarian reform, or land titling) since 1975.  The
specification was similar for the cross sectional analysis of conservation measures and
levels of outcomes, except that population density and literacy rate were included as
explanatory variables instead of changes in these, and distance to the nearest road and to
the urban market were used instead of indicators of change in road access.  The60
 See Pender, Scherr and Duron (1999) and Pender and Scherr (1999) for more
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details on the econometric specifications.
 The pathway variables are predicted using the multinomial regression described
11
previously.  Population growth and the presence of government programs were predicted
using 1974 population density, indicators of agricultural potential (altitude and average
number of rainfall days), distance of the village from Tegucigalpa, and indicators of
wealth and access to various services in 1974 (proportion of households with a dirt floor,
access to potable water, sanitation, electricity, radio, or a sewing machine in 1974; adult
literacy rate in 1974).  Standard errors were not corrected for the use of predicted values
of explanatory variables in these regressions because of the difficulty of deriving
analytical formula for the covariance matrix for such complex models (e.g., multinomial
logit, probit, and least squares used in the first stage regressions, ordered probit in the
second stage).  Bootstrapping was also judged not to be appropriate because of the small
number of observations per stratum (12).  Thus, Pender, Scherr and Duron (1999) did not
report the results of the multistage regressions, but only use them to check the robustness
of the findings.
determinants of organizational development and collective action were similar, but also
included total village population (as a factor affecting demand for collective action), the
population growth rate and growth rate squared (to investigate the hypothesis of an
inverted U-shaped relationship between population growth and collective action), and the
percentage of the village that had been born in the same municipality (to investigate
whether stability of village population affects collective action).
10
Possible endogeneity of some explanatory variables—particularly population
growth, the development pathways, and government programs—could lead to biased
estimates.  In all regressions including these explanatory variables, we ran the regressions
twice, using predicted and actual values of these variables, to investigate the robustness of
the results.   We report which results are significant and robust below.  In all regressions,
11
the standard errors were corrected for sample weights, stratification, and finite
population, and are robust to heteroskedasticity.61
RESULTS
Impacts on Responses
The empirical results concerning the impacts of population pressure on household
and collective responses in central Honduras are summarized in Table 3.  As
hypothesized, we find that population growth is significantly and robustly associated with
agricultural extensification, as measured by the likelihood of decline in forest area. 
Population growth is also associated with collective action and organizational
development, and the relationship has the hypothesized inverted-U shape.   A higher
population level is also associated with collective action and organizational development
(though the result is robust only for organizational development), consistent with the
hypothesis that higher population implies higher demand for such collective responses. 
As expected, higher population density is associated with some labor-intensive practices
and land investments, including use of cattle manure and investments in live barriers and
trees.  Lower initial population density was positively associated with expansion of basic
grains (maize, beans and sorghum) production and expansion of horticultural production
(although the result was robust only for horticultural expansion).  Higher population
density is associated with less likelihood of collective action to improve common lands
and control runoff, consistent with the expectation that resource scarcity may undermine
collective action.
None of the statistically significant results is inconsistent with our expectations, as
noted above.  However, the lack of significant impact of population pressure on many
responses is also notable, particularly with regard to changes in the fallow system and62
adoption of several labor-intensive practices and land investments.  Reductions in use of
fallow and adoption of labor-intensive measures were much more strongly influenced by
access to technical assistance and other government programs, and the development
pathway being pursued.  In general, technical assistance programs promoted more labor-
intensive practices, especially conservation practices.  Other programs had mixed effects
on such practices.  Adoption of labor-intensive measures varied greatly across
development pathways, with different measures apparently suited to different pathways.   
Capital intensity was also not significantly affected by population pressure, and
much more affected by road access and the development pathways.  Road access favored
all kinds of capital intensification.  Adoption of purchased inputs was more common in
more commercialized pathways, while use of oxen and plowing was less common in the
more peri-urban non-farm employment and horticultural pathways.
Although population pressure did not have a statistically significant direct effect on
many aspects of intensification in the econometric analysis, this does not prove that
population pressure had no impact on these aspects.  Given the relatively small number of
observations, the statistical power to discern such effects was relatively low, especially63
Table 3  Evidence of responses to population pressure in Central Honduras
Response Indicator  Effect of Effec
t
Extensification Change in forest area (1975- Change in population density - ®
1996) (1974-1988)
Shorten fallow Change in use of fallow Change in population density 0
cycle
Labor Change in use of burning Change in population density 0
intensification
Use of contour planting  1988 population density 0
(in 1996)
Use of mulching 0
Use of incorporation of crop 0
residues
Use of cattle manure + ®
Labor-intensive Constructed terraces (since 1974 population density 0
land investments 1975)
Planting live barriers + ®
Constructing stone walls 0
Planting trees + ®
Capital Change in oxen use Change in population density 0
intensification
Change in use of plow 0
Change in use of insecticides 064
Table 3  Evidence of responses to population pressure in Central Honduras
(continued)
Response Indicator  Effect of Effec
t













Collective action Collective investment to control 1974 population 0
runoff/improve common lands
1974 population density - ®
Population growth rate (1974- + ®
1988)
Population growth rate squared - ®
Organizational Number of local organizations  1974 population  + ®
development
1974 population density 0
Population growth rate (1974- + ®
1988)
Population growth rate squared -®
+ means a positive and statistically significant effect at the 5% level.
- means a negative and statistically significant effect at the 5% level.
0 means effect is not statistically significant at the 5% level.
® means the effect is also statistically significant at the 10% level if population growth
(where applicable), government programs and development pathways are replaced by
their predicted values in the regression.
Source:  Pender, Scherr and Duron, 1999; Pender and Scherr, 199865
  This result is from the regressions used to predict the presence of government
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programs.  Population density did not have a significant effect on the presence of other
government programs.  These regression results are available upon request.
 for responses that did not vary greatly within the sample (such as qualitative changes in
use of particular practices, which were generally in the same direction, or adoption of
conservation measures, which was generally low).
Furthermore, population pressure may have indirect effects on intensification via its
effects on other factors, such as the development pathways, government programs, or
infrastructure development.  For example, since lower initial population density appears
to have favored horticultural expansion, and horticultural expansion is associated with
adoption of purchased inputs, population pressure may indirectly reduce use of purchased
inputs by undermining horticultural expansion. Lower initial population density is also
associated with the presence of technical assistance programs and road development,
perhaps because people are wealthier and more politically connected in less densely
populated areas.  Paradoxically, lower population density communities may thus have
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been encouraged to adopt more labor-intensive methods by technical assistance programs
than in higher population density communities where such programs were less present. 
Lower population density also appears to have favored adoption of capital intensive
methods, to the extent that this contributed to road development.  These indirect effects
do not support the hypothesis of population-induced intensification of labor or capital.66
Impacts on Outcomes
The impacts of population pressure on outcomes in central Honduras are
summarized in Table 4.  Population density is found to have a negative association with
maize yield and with the presence of forest on steep land (having slope greater than 30%),
and a positive association with cultivation on steep lands.  The negative association of
population density and maize yield is not consistent with our expectations of the effects
of population-induced labor intensification, and suggests that population pressure is
associated with land degradation.  This is consistent with the estimated impact of
population growth on changes in maize yields and perceived cropland quality, although
these impacts were not statistically significant at the 5% level.  The associations of
population density with forest and cultivated area on steep lands are consistent with the
hypothesis of population-induced intensification on marginal lands, and also with the
results on forest area discussed earlier.  Generally, the evidence suggests that population
pressure is causing land degradation in central Honduras.
We do not find evidence of a significant and robust impact of population density or
population growth on indicators of labor productivity or poverty.  Surprisingly,
population growth is positively associated with wage growth, but this effect is not robust
when predicted population growth is used in the regression.  This suggests that the
positive association is due to the endogeneity of population growth, and that population
growth responds positively to rising wages (via migration), rather than the other way
around.67
Table 4  Evidence of outcomes of population pressure in Central Honduras
Outcome Indicator  Effect of Effect
Productivity Maize yield, 1996 Population density, 1988 - ®
Ln(high male wage), 1996 0
Change in Change in maize yield, 1975-96 Change in population 0
productivity density, 1974-88
Change in ln(male wage)  +
Resource conditions Forest on steep land, late 1970’s Population density, 1974 - ®
Cultivation on steep land, late + ®
1970’s
Change in resource Perceived change in cropland Change in population 0
conditions quality, 1975-96 density
Perceived change in forest 0
quality
Perceived change in water +
availability
Perceived change in water +
quality
Poverty Proportion of houses with a dirt Population density, 1988 0
floor, 1988
Proportion of households where 0
last child died
Change in poverty Change in proportion of houses Change in population 0
with a dirt floor, 1974-1988 density, 1974-1988
Change in proportion of 0
households where last child died
+ means a positive and statistically significant effect at the 5% level.
- means a negative and statistically significant effect at the 5% level.
0 means effect is not statistically significant at the 5% level.
® means the effect is also statistically significant at the 10% level if population growth
(where applicable), government programs and development pathways are replaced by
their predicted values in the regression.
Source:  Pender, Scherr and Duron, 199968
 I do not estimate the indirect effects of population pressure on outcomes via its
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impact on presence of government programs, because of the insignificance (and
sometimes implausible signs) of the coefficients of government programs in the outcome
regressions.  I do not estimate the predicted effects of population growth on measures of
changes in outcomes because most of these measures are ordinal variables (except
changes in poverty measures), making the interpretation of predicted values problematic.
As discussed above, the insignificant impacts of population pressure in these
regressions do not prove that it has no effect.  The statistical power of the regressions is
low, as noted above.  Furthermore, the impacts of population growth may be dispersed by
migration.  For example, changes in wages and poverty may be similar across
communities as a result of migration, even though population growth may be having a
generalized impact on wages and poverty in the central region of Honduras as a whole.  
It is difficult to identify such effects in a study conducted in a single, relatively integrated
labor market.
To the extent that population pressure affected the development pathways (and
other factors), it may have had indirect effects on outcomes.  Table 5 presents the results
of simulations of the direct and indirect effects of changing population density and road
access on various outcomes, assuming the indirect effects are due to the effects on
development pathways.
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The indirect impacts of population pressure are smaller in magnitude than the direct
effects in all cases, and in the same direction as the direct effects in all but one case
(effect on maize yield).  The predicted overall effects of population pressure are
unfavorable for land productivity and pressure on steep lands, favorable for wages and69
Table 5  Predicted effects of population pressure and market access on outcomes
Factor Effect Productivity, 1996 Resource conditions, late 1970s Poverty, 1988
Maize ln (male Percentage Percentage of Percentage of Percentage Percentage of
yield wage) of steep of houses
land in where last child
forest died
steep land steep land households
de-vegetated cultivated with dirt
floors
(kg/ha) (Lps/day)
Higher population Direct -31.3 0.0037 -0.55 0.32 0.25 -0.22 0.02
density (by 1 Indirect 6.6 0.0028 -0.37 0.29 0.03 -0.09 0.00
Total -24.7 0.0065 -0.92 0.61 0.28 -0.31 0.02
Further from road Direct -119.4 -0.0615 -0.91 2.64 -1.17 -0.51 0.24
(by 1 km) Indirect -366.2 -0.0930 2.52 -4.14 1.22 1.01 0.35
Total -485.6 -0.1545 1.61 -1.50 0.05 0.50 0.59
Source:  Pender, Scherr and Duron (1999).70
housing quality, and negligible for child mortality.  In general the predicted impacts are
relatively small, particularly in comparison to the impacts of road access.  If
improvements in road access were undermined by population pressure (recall the negative
association between initial population density and road construction noted above),
population pressure may have had additional indirect impacts which would have helped
to reduce deforestation on steep land but also reduced productivity and increased poverty.
CONCLUSIONS
There are many possible household and collective responses to rural population
pressure.  These responses are affected by many site-specific factors, may interact in
complex ways, and may be subject to path dependency.  It is therefore difficult to predict
what impacts rural population pressure will have on agriculture and natural resource
management, agricultural productivity, poverty or natural resource conditions.  I have
considered a large number of plausible hypotheses about these impacts, arguing that the
impacts of population growth are more likely negative when there is no collective
response than when population growth induces infrastructure development, collective
action, institutional or organizational development.  Beyond this general proposition, the
impacts of population pressure, particularly on natural resource conditions, may be very
different in different contexts.  Thus careful empirical work is required in different
contexts before general conclusions can be drawn.71
Despite the large volume of literature and debate concerning the relationship
between population pressure and resource conditions in developing countries, there is still
a paucity of empirical evidence from which to draw general conclusions.  Much of the
evidence that is cited is based on case studies that, though useful, may not be
generalizable.  In this chapter, I have reported results from two recent studies of these
issues in central Honduras, based on a survey conducted in a representative sample of
villages.  Conducting similar studies in different agroecological and socioeconomic
environments would help to overcome the present gap in empirical knowledge about the
impacts of rural population growth on natural resource management and their
implications.
The results from Honduras support the concern that population pressure leads to
land degradation in a situation of relatively low population density and available land, by
encouraging expansion of agricultural production onto marginal steep lands and causing
lower land productivity.  We also found that population pressure promoted adoption of
some labor-intensive soil fertility management practices and land improvements,
although the adoption of such practices remained low and was largely determined by the
presence of technical assistance programs.  Moderate population growth was found to
promote collective action to manage common resources and organizational development,
consistent with the induced innovation hypothesis.  Despite these impacts, we found that
population pressure had a statistically insignificant impact on wages and poverty, and that
the magnitude of the estimated impacts were relatively small.  Even when indirect72
impacts of population pressure on occupational and product choice were considered, the
impacts remained relatively small.  
The results from central Honduras suggest that other factors besides population
pressure have been more important in determining agricultural change, resource
management practices, wages and poverty.  Notable among these are road development
and technical assistance programs.  Although induced innovation theory suggests that
both of these types of interventions would be more likely in more densely populated
settings, we found just the opposite—i.e., these interventions were more likely in less
densely populated communities.  This may have been an anomalous result of the
particular political setting of Honduras.  Nevertheless, it emphasizes the point that such
“induced” policy responses are by no means automatic, nor necessarily in the direction
one might expect.  It also suggests that policies may not have been efficient; for example,
by promoting labor-intensive practices through technical assistance programs focused in
less densely populated areas.
The evidence from central Honduras suggests the importance of considering the
complex array of conditioning factors that influence the responses of communities and
households to population growth or other pressures.  Particularly important among these
are the factors leading to differences in changing comparative advantage, as summarized
by the pathways of development.   Within particular development pathways, the processes
of induced technological, institutional and organizational development may proceed
differently, with different long term implications for resource management and human
welfare.  73
The results from Honduras may not be representative of situations where initial
population density, agricultural potential or other factors are significantly different.  In
particular, the relatively low population density of central Honduras may account for the
limited degree of intensification and innovation found in response to population pressure. 
It may be that such responses only occur at higher population densities than were present
in most of the study communities.  Further research is needed to explore these issues in
different demographic, agroecological and socioeconomic contexts.
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